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Introduction 
Various indicators of corruption show that South Korea has been relatively successful in 
controlling of corruption, compared to other Asian countries, although the country’s 
performance is still below OECD standards. In particular, the level of petty bureaucratic 
corruption is among the best in Asia, along with Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore according 
to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer surveys. Petty electoral 
corruption and vote-buying practices have almost disappeared, although corporate and 
political corruption are still of considerable concern (Kalinowski and Kim 2014). The country’s 
ranks in CPI and Control of Corruption indicators seem to reflect both the substantial 
improvements and the ongoing problems. South Korea’s CPI score in 2014 was 55, out of a 
possible perfect score of 100, and ranked 44 out of 174 countries. The country’s Control of 
Corruption score in 2013 was 0.55- standard deviation above the world mean, or at the 70.3 
percentile rank. The country’s reasonably good performance in control of corruption indicates 
that norms of ethical universalism largely prevail over particularism, although the latter is still 
significant in some areas such as corporate governance and business-government relations. 
(See the Appendix for various indicators of control of corruption in South Korea.) 
While South Korea today is widely recognized as a rich and robust democracy with 
relatively good governance, many Western observers considered the country a hopelessly 
corrupt and poor autocracy in the 1950s. Since its independence a little more than a half 
century ago, South Korea has been transitioning, if not completed a transition, from 
particularism of the limited access order to ethical universalism of the open access order 
(North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; You 2012). How did this happen? Is the development of 
good governance based on ethical universalism a natural byproduct of economic 
development? Otherwise, was good governance established by a benevolent dictator or 
achieved by people’s struggles? Have governance norms developed gradually over time, or 
suddenly at some critical junctures? Who and what factors are responsible for the changes? 
These are the questions I attempt to address in this paper (chapter). 
I will first assess the political, economic and social bases of contemporary control of 
corruption in South Korea, focusing on how norms of ethical universalism prevail over 
particularism. Then, I will look at the early period of post-independence, or the period of the 
first president Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), when particularism was dominant. Comparison 
of the political, economic and social bases of corruption control in the two periods indicates 
that it’s not just the level of economic development but broader political economy that 
differentiates the two periods. This suggests that the changes in governance norms were not 
just a byproduct of economic development. In order to identify the causes of change, I will 
conduct process-tracing, or causal process observation, of the broad political economy of 
governance norms. I will focus on the role of human agency in changing norms of 
governance, while not neglecting the effects of structural factors.  
My process-tracing of dynamic sequence of events helps to distinguish four periods 
with different equilibria of norms of particularism and universalism. Each period is defined by 
major political events. The first period (1948-60) starts with the establishment of two separate 
states in the Korean peninsula in 1948. The second period (1960-1987) starts with the April 
19 Student Revolution of 1960, followed by the May 16 military coup of 1961. The third 
period (1987-1997) starts with the democratic transition of 1987 and ends with the financial 
 
 
 
 
crisis and the humiliating IMF bailout loan of 1997. The fourth period (1997- ), in which 
ethical universalism has become dominant, was ushered in with the first transfer of power to 
the opposition and the sweeping reform of corporate and financial sectors in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. 
I also identify several critical reforms that have contributed to the change of 
governance norms. The dissolution of the landed aristocracy and relatively equal distribution 
of wealth due to sweeping land reform (1948 and 1950) and rapid expansion of education 
laid the structural foundations for the growth of ethical universalism. Gradual expansion of 
civil service examinations (1950s-1990s), democratization (1960 and 1987), good 
governance reforms (1988- ) and post-financial crisis economic reform (1998-9) promoted 
norms of ethical universalism. I will explore how these reforms were carried out, who the 
main actors were, what made them possible, and what impact they made on governance 
norms. 
Political, Social and Economic Bases of Contemporary Control of Corruption 
In this section, I will examine the political, social and economic bases of contemporary 
control of corruption in South Korea. I will consider broad political economy of the country 
that affects opportunities and constraints for corruption. In particular, I will focus on the 
features of ethical universalism vs. particularism in bureaucratic structure, political 
competition and underlying socio-economic conditions such as the distribution of power 
resources and strength of civil society.  
In contemporary South Korea, meritocracy is pretty well established in bureaucratic 
appointment and promotion, and the manner of public administration is largely impartial. 
Programmatic competition, rather than clientelistic competition, largely defines Korean 
politics. Corruption scandals still occur frequently, but corrupt politicians are prosecuted and 
punished at the polls quite rigorously. While particularism is still significant in some of the 
political, social and economic spheres, ethical universalism and rule of law are largely 
respected in Korean society today.  
Bureaucratic structure 
Empirical studies have shown that Weberian bureaucracy, in particular, meritocratic 
recruitment, is closely associated with lower corruption (Rauch and Evans 2000; Dahlstrom, 
Teorell and Lapuente 2012). Meritocratic recruitment is considered an important feature of 
universalism, while the prevalence of patronage appointments in many developing countries 
is an important manifestation of particularism. South Korea has been widely recognized for 
its autonomous, meritocratic and competent bureaucracy, or Weberian type of bureaucracy. 
According to Evans and Rauch’s (1999) “Weberianness” scores data for thirty-five 
developing countries in the period of 1970 to 1990, South Korea was among the best with a 
Weberianness score of 13, much higher than the sample mean of 7.2 and behind only 
Singapore with a score of 13.5. South Korea received good scores in all three components of 
Weberianness, i.e., meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion and salary. Recently, the 
Quality of Government Institute at Gothenburg University conducted a survey of bureaucratic 
structure for 105 countries in the world (Teorell, Dahlstrom and Dahlberg 2011). South Korea 
scored 5.05 in terms of “professional bureaucracy” or absence of patronage, much higher 
than the sample mean of 3.93, and ranked 12th (just behind Canada) out of 105 countries. 
The country scored 0.71 in terms of “impartial administration,” or absence of bureaucratic 
 
 
 
 
corruption, much higher than the sample mean of -0.11, and ranked 19th (just behind the 
United States). 
Party system and electoral mobilization 
An important distinction between universalism and particularism in political competition and 
electoral mobilization can be found in the relative prevalence of programmatic competition 
vs. clientelistic competition. While programmatic competition/mobilization takes place 
surrounding different political parties offering different policies that are applied equally to 
everyone who meets certain criteria or to the whole population, clientelistic 
competition/mobilization takes place surrounding particularistic benefits in exchange for 
political support. Clientelism typically involves exchange of individualistic constituency 
service and votes as well as more outright vote buying in cash, gift, entertainment, and 
promise of public sector jobs. Thus clientelism increases not only petty electoral corruption, it 
also increases high-level political corruption because of politicians’ need for clientelistic 
resources and bureaucratic corruption through provision of patronage jobs in the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, clientelism makes voters clients of politicians as patron, thus voters 
cannot hold politicians accountable. The assumption in the principal-agent model of 
corruption that democratic elections enable voters (principal) punish corrupt politicians 
(agent) collapses in clientelism (You 2015: 23-27). 
In today’s South Korean politics, clientelistic competition based on particularistic 
provision of constituency services and favors for political support is still significant, but vote-
buying practices have almost disappeared. Elections are mostly defined by programmatic 
competition between major parties with different ideological orientation and policy programs 
(You 2015: 105-114). While major parties frequently change their names and reshuffle, and 
sometimes split and/or merge with others, the two major parties-one more conservative and 
the other more liberal/progressive- are always clearly identified and recognized by people. 
There have been two peaceful transfers of power: from a conservative government to a 
liberal one in 1997 and back to a conservative one in 2007. Also, smaller parties on the left 
have been clearly recognized by the populace. Regional politics is no less significant than 
ideological politics, with the main conservative party enjoying strong support in Youngnam 
region, or the Southeastern part of the country, and the main liberal/progressive party having 
a strong base in Honam region, or the Southwestern part of the country. Regional politics is 
substantially intertwined with ideological politics (Moon 2005), but the importance of regional 
cleavage has been gradually and slowly declining as the importance of ideological and 
generational cleavages have been rapidly growing (Kang 2008; Seong 2015). While 
clientelistic practices to exchange votes for particularistic benefits have become substantially 
less frequent than in the early years of post-democratic transition, clientelistic relations with 
the business are still an important reason for recurring corruption scandals. 
  
 
 
 
 
Distribution of power and power resources  
As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) noted, particularism mirrors the vicious distribution of power, 
which in turn is affected by the distribution of power resources. In authoritarian regimes, in 
which power is concentrated and access to power is limited to privileged individuals and 
groups, particularism prevails. In democracies, politicians are held accountable by the people 
through elections and concentration of power is further prevented by horizontal mechanisms 
of checks and balances between branches of government. Voting power is equally 
distributed to every citizen in principle, but skewed distribution of income, wealth, knowledge 
(education), social networks and other power resources can undermine political equality and 
norms of ethical universalism. High economic inequality not only increases the risk of elite 
capture but also encourages clientelism (You 2015: 30-34). A large proportion of the poor 
population is vulnerable to clientelism, and the wealthy elite have incentives to prevent 
programmatic politics from developing because programmatic competition could strengthen 
leftist parties. There is a strong correlation between inequality and clientelism, and the 
correlation is stronger among countries with longer histories of democracy (You 2015: 236-
244). 
While South Korea’s president enjoys strong constitutional power, checks and 
balances have been strengthened over time since the democratic transition. In particular, 
frequent occurrence of divided government often placed strong constraints on the executive 
from increasingly assertive legislature. However, the conservative Lee Myung-bak (2008-
2012) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) administrations have enjoyed a comfortable majority 
of their party in the National Assembly. With little constraint from the legislature, the 
presidents filled the vacancies in the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and National 
Human Rights Commission with very conservative people. There are concerns that the 
independence of the courts and the commission has been compromised. Also, there are 
growing concerns about politicization of the prosecution and suppression of free speech (You 
2014a; Haggard and You 2015). 
South Korea has been recognized as a success story for “growth with equity” (World 
Bank 1993; Rodrik 1995). The country used to enjoy an unusually equal distribution of 
income and wealth and a high level of human capital (You 1998). Thus, South Korea has 
been known to have favorable structural conditions for state autonomy and good 
governance. On the other hand, there have been concerns about economic concentration by 
large chaebols and crony capitalism (Kang 2002; Kalinowski 2009). Recent studies show that 
both income inequality and chaebol concentration are rising rapidly. Kim (2011) shows that 
chaebol concentration, which declined for several years after the post-financial crisis reform, 
has been rising again. Kim and Kim (2014) shows that the top 1 percent’s income share has 
been increasing rapidly since the late 1990s. In addition, there is evidence that increasing 
income inequality has resulted in an increasing gap in educational opportunity (Kim 2014).  
While the increasing concentration of wealth and income among the few is eroding 
the structural foundations for good governance, a vibrant civil society is functioning as an 
important check on corporate malfeasance as well as abuse of public office. Civil society 
organizations are highly trusted and respected and exert considerable political influence in 
South Korea. According to the 2015 Edelman Trust Barometer, NGOs are more highly 
trusted in Korea (68) than in other countries (global mean=63), while government and 
business are less trusted in Korea (33 and 36, respectively) than in other countries (global 
mean=48 and 57, respectively).  
 
 
 
 
Political, Social and Economic Bases of Control of Corruption during the First 
Republic (1948-1960) and the Subsequent Development of Governance Norms 
South Korea during the First Republic, or Syngman Rhee period (1948-60) was a poor 
country with rampant corruption. Clientelism dominated politics, patronage appointments 
were common in bureaucracy, and favoritism and nepotism were the norm in much of policy-
making and policy-implementing processes. Overall, particularism prevailed and corruption 
was part of everyday life from the top to the bottom of the society. However, the dissolution 
of the landed aristocracy, relatively egalitarian socio-economic structure, and rapid 
expansion of education provided favorable conditions for future development of civil society 
and norms of ethical universalism. 
Distribution of power and power resources during the Rhee period 
While the country was formally a democracy, President Syngman Rhee became increasingly 
authoritarian, amending the constitution twice in irregular ways to remove the presidential 
term limit for the first president of the country. Power was concentrated on the president and 
the National Assembly lost the power to check the abuse of the executive. The police and the 
bureaucracy effectively became the political machinery of the president’s Liberal Party.  
Civil society was weak. Leftist political parties and left-leaning political and civil 
groups were completely suppressed. Government-organized and/or government-sponsored 
rightist organizations, including some violent youth groups, trade union, women’s groups, 
dominated civil society. Thus space for autonomous civil society was very narrow. 
While almost everyone was poor, emerging industrialists sought lucrative business 
opportunities from the government’s distribution of former Japanese-owned enterprises and 
import licenses. Large amounts of US aid were another important source of rents. 
Distribution of aid was not administered impartially, but favoritism and nepotism were 
common. Thus, the ruling Liberal Party and bureaucrats had plentiful resources to distribute 
to their supporters, clans and cronies. Business success was dependent more on political 
connections than on productivity and competitiveness. 
There was no dominant class that could capture the state after the landed aristocracy 
had been dissolved by the land reform. With the introduction of universal primary education, 
the enrollment for primary education rose rapidly and reached almost 100 percent by the end 
of 1950s. Secondary and tertiary education also expanded tremendously (McGinn et al. 
1980). However, such structurally favorable conditions for state autonomy and norms of 
ethical universalism did not automatically make such norms take roots.  
Clientelistic politics during the Rhee period 
As Keefer (2007) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) argue, young democracies are prone to 
clientelism because it takes time for political parties to build policy reputations. Indeed 
personalistic and clientelistic competition dominated National Assembly elections in the early 
years in South Korea. The proportion of independents elected in the 1948, 1950 and 1952 
legislative elections ranged between 40 and 60 percent. Major political parties did not have 
any substantial differences in policy directions, except for the opposition party’s criticism 
against the increasingly authoritarian style of governance. The two-party system was not 
established until the 1956 and 1958 elections, from which national elections became 
contests between the authoritarian ruling party and the pro-democracy opposition party (You 
2015: 106).  
 
 
 
 
Although the party system became gradually institutionalized and a certain degree of 
programmatic competition surrounding the issue of democratization emerged, the ruling 
Liberal Party’s reliance on clientelistic mobilization was strengthened as President Rhee’s 
popularity waned over time. Thus clientelism and vote buying practices became increasingly 
prevalent not only in legislative and local elections but also in presidential elections. Major 
corruption scandals broke out during every presidential election year, as the government 
dispensed favors to the incipient chaebol in return for illicit political contributions (You 2015: 
131). 
Bureaucratic patronage during the Rhee period 
Competitive civil service examination was implemented, starting from 1949. However, most 
civil servants during the Syngman Rhee period were recruited via special appointments 
rather than civil service examinations. Many of the special appointments were patronage jobs 
dispensed by powerful politicians and senior bureaucrats. Rampant practices of patronage 
appointment led to endemic bureaucratic corruption, because those bureaucrats who 
obtained their job via patronage sought to repay their patrons and get promotions by bribing 
powerful officials. The insignificant role of the civil service examination in establishing a 
meritocratic bureaucracy was caused by at least two problems. First, the bulk of the civil 
servants had to be hired before the establishment of the civil service examination. Since the 
South Korean state was creating a new bureaucracy, it was to a certain extent inevitable to 
recruit the bulk of civil servants from the pool of Korean officials previously serving in the 
American Military Government (1945-48), many of whom had worked for the Japanese 
colonial government. Second, the civil service examinations were administered for the 
higher-entry level (Grade III-B) and middle-entry level (Grade IV-B) but not for the lower-entry 
level (Grade V-B) during the Syngman Rhee period. The demand for new recruitment at the 
higher- and middle-entry levels was not large after recruiting a large number of officials via 
special appointment during the first few years, while the annual number of recruitments at the 
lower-entry level was much larger. This provided a large room for patronage appointments. 
Even for the new recruits at the higher- and middle-entry levels, the proportion of civil service 
examination passers was less than a half during the 1950s, leaving substantial room for 
special appointments. 
Development of governance norms in South Korea 
As we have seen above, governance norms during the Syngman Rhee period (1948-60) and 
those in the contemporary South Korea are radically different. How have they changed? 
Process-tracing of changes in governance norms suggests that there were four distinct 
periods with different equilibria of norms of particularism and universalism. Between the first 
period (1948-60) in which norms of particularism were dominant and the fourth period (1998- 
) in which ethical universalism became dominant, there were two intermediate periods. Table 
1 summarizes governance norms, critical reforms, major actors and context variables for 
each period. 
The first period (1948-60), or a period of new state building, starts with the 
establishment of two separate states in the Korean peninsula in 1948. It went through a 
devastating civil war (1950-53) that developed into the first international war of the Cold War 
era. Although the first period (1948-60) was characterized by the norms of particularism, 
there were important reforms that had long-lasting effects on the development of norms of 
ethical universalism: introduction of formal institutions of democracy, universal primary 
education, and implementation of far-reaching land reform. In particular, land reform 
 
 
 
 
fundamentally changed the class structure of Korean society that had been long dominated 
by the landed aristocracy. The reform also contributed to the rapid expansion of education by 
making education affordable to those tenant-turned-owner-cultivators. 
Table 1. Development of governance norms in South Korea 
Period Governance Norms Critical Reforms Actors Context Variables 
1948-
1960 
Particularism, with 
formal institutions of 
universalism 
 
*Clientelistic politics 
*Bureaucratic 
patronage 
*Favoritism, 
nepotism  
*Business, relying on 
political connections 
Land reform 
(1948, 1950) 
 
Formal 
democracy 
*Universal 
suffrage (1948) 
*Universal primary 
education (1948) 
*Civil service 
exam (1949) 
*Popular demand 
*U.S. 
*National Assembly 
*President Rhee 
 
Opponents: 
Landlords, Korea 
Democratic Party 
*North Korea’s radical 
land reform (1946) 
*Korean War (1950-
53) 
*Poor 
*Inequality, reduced 
*Landed aristocracy, 
dissolved 
*Educational 
expansion 
1960-
1987 
Particularism, with 
some development 
of universalism 
 
*Meritocratic 
bureaucracy 
*Business, relying on 
exports (efficiency) & 
government favors 
Democratization 
movements  
*Student 
Revolution (1960) 
*Civil service 
exam, expanded 
(1960-) 
*military coup 
(1961) 
*Spring of Seoul & 
military crackdown 
(1980) 
*Students 
*Professors & 
religious leaders 
*Urban, educated 
middle class 
*Working class 
 
Opponents: 
*Military 
*Chaebol 
*U.S. support of the 
military regimes 
*Security threat from & 
economic competition 
with North Korea 
*Rapid, export-
oriented 
 Industrialization 
*Chaebol 
concentration 
*Growing middle class 
& working class 
 
1987-
1997 
Particularism & 
ethical universalism, 
in conflict 
 
*Rule of law 
*Clientelistic politics 
*Capture by chaebol 
Democratic 
transition (1987) 
 
Transparency & 
anti-corruption 
reform (1993-5) 
*CSOs (CCEJ, 
PSPD, TI-Korea) 
*Popular demand 
*President Kim 
Young-sam 
 
Opponents: 
*Chaebol 
*Clientelistic 
politicians 
* Empowerment of civil 
society 
*Growing political 
influence of chaebol 
1998- Ethical universalism, 
with some 
particularism 
 
*Programmatic 
politics 
*Corporate 
governance, ups & 
downs 
Corporate & 
financial reform 
(1998-99) 
 
Transparency & 
anti-corruption 
reform (1998- ) 
*CSOs 
*Popular demand, 
esp. younger 
generation 
*Presidents Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun 
 
Opponents: 
*Chaebol 
*Clientelistic 
politicians 
*Financial crisis & IMF 
bailout (1997) 
*Change of governing 
parties (1998) 
*Transfer of power 
back to the 
conservative (2008) 
The second period (1960-87) was a period of democratization movements under military 
authoritarianism. This period starts with the April 19 Student Revolution of 1960, followed by 
the May 16 military coup of 1961. There was an important development during this period: 
civil service reform, or development of a meritocratic bureaucracy. This was also a period of 
state-led industrialization and growth of chaebol. Developmental state literature has tended 
to credit Park Chung-hee for establishing a meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracy and 
 
 
 
 
launching an export-oriented industrialization policy, which was impartially implemented by 
the autonomous bureaucracy. My study shows, however, that a meritocratic bureaucracy 
was not established overnight by Park Chung-hee but developed gradually for a long time 
and that the short-lived democratic government of Chang Myon (1960-61) made no less 
important contributions than Park did.  
The third period (1987-97), or early period of democratic consolidation, starts with the 
democratic transition of 1987 and ends with the financial crisis of 1997. This period was 
marked by conflicts between the norms of particularism and the norms of ethical 
universalism. While President Kim Young-sam carried out some important transparency and 
anticorruption reforms, he was unable to cut his party’s clientelism and collusion with the 
chaebol. Economic liberalization reforms removed much of the state control of the private 
sector, but fell short of removing state protection of the chaebol privilege and reforming 
corporate governance of the chaebol. 
The fourth period (1998- ), which started with a first turnover of power to the 
opposition and sweeping economic reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis, is a period 
of democratic deepening. As I described in section 2, programmatic party competition 
developed and clientelism and vote buying declined. Political finances became more 
transparent. Corporate governance improved and markets became more competitive, 
although there have been some worrisome regressions in recent years. 
In order to understand how the norms of governance have changed, we need to 
examine how the critical reforms were carried out and what impact they made with regard to 
the governance norms. 
The Political Economy of Governance Reforms 
In this section, I will explore the political economy of five critical reforms in South Korean 
history: land reform, civil service reform, democratization, good governance reform and post-
financial crisis economic reform. While land reform is not a governance reform but a 
redistributive reform, it laid the structural foundations for future governance reforms. My 
analysis will focus on who (actors) and what (context variables) were responsible for these 
reforms, how these reforms were carried out, and what impact they made on the change of 
governance norms.  
Land reform (1948, 1950) 
South Korea inherited a highly unequal and skewed distribution of land at the time of 
independence. The richest 2.7 percent of rural households owned two-thirds of all the 
cultivated lands, while 58 percent owned no land at all (You 2015: 68). However, the 
sweeping land reforms implemented in 1948 and 1950 completely changed the distribution of 
land.  
Land redistribution in South Korea was carried out in two stages: by the U.S. Military 
Government (USMG) in 1948 and by the South Korean government in 1950. In March 1948, 
the USMG distributed 240,000 hectares of former Japanese lands to former tenants, which 
accounted for 11.7 percent of total cultivated land. The land was sold to the tenant-
cultivators, who would pay three times the annual harvest in installments over 15 years 
(Mitchell 1949).  
When the first election was held in the south in May 1948, all parties pledged to 
implement land reform and the constitution included a commitment to land reform. Syngman 
 
 
 
 
Rhee’s government implemented agrarian land reform in 1950, just before the Korean War 
broke out. Restricting the upper ceiling of landownership to three hectares per household, 
the government redistributed the excess farmland and all lands owned by absentee landlords 
that amounted to 330,000 hectares of farmland. The landlords received 1.5 times the annual 
value of all crops in compensation from the government, and their former tenants were to pay 
the same amount to the government in five years. The implementation of the reform was 
expedient. The land redistribution was effectively completed before May 30, 1950, when the 
second National Assembly elections were held. In anticipation of the reforms, about 500,000 
hectares had been sold directly by landlords to their tenants, the bulk in 1948 and 1949 
(Hong 2001).  
In total, ownership of 52 percent of the total cultivated land, or 89 percent of the land 
that had been cultivated by tenants, was transferred to them and the “principle of land-to-the- 
tiller” was realized. By 1956, the top 6 percent owned only 18 percent of the cultivated lands. 
Tenancy dropped from 49 percent to 7 percent of all farming households, and the area of 
cultivated land under tenancy fell from 65 percent to 18 percent (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 
1980; Lie 1998). The land gini dropped from 0.73 in 1945 to 0.38-0.39 in 1960. Thus, South 
Korea fundamentally transformed rural class structure by implementing one of the most 
radical land reforms in the non-communist world (You 2015: 68-75).  
Land reform profoundly transformed Korean society. The traditional yangban 
(aristocracy) landlord class was dissolved. Peasants became farmers (Lie 1998). Land 
reform opened space for state autonomy from the dominant class, as there was no organized 
privileged class or special interests immediately after the land reform. Land redistribution and 
the destruction of large private properties during the Korean War produced an unusually 
equal distribution of assets and income in Korea (Mason et al. 1980; You 1998). The income 
share of the top 1 percent fell from around 20 percent during the 1930s to around 7 percent 
during the period from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, according to Kim and Kim (2014). 
Although the data is missing for the period between the early 1940s and the late 1970s, the 
steep fall in the income share of the top 1 percent cannot be explained without the role of 
land reform. 
Land reform also facilitated expansion of education, by making education affordable 
to more people. Land reform also encouraged many large landowners to contribute their land 
to educational institutions, because educational institutions were exempted from 
expropriation of land (Park 1987; Oh 2004). At the time of independence about 80 percent of 
people had not had public schooling of any kind. Less than two percent of the Korean 
population had more than primary education, and only 0.03 percent had university education 
(McGinn et al. 1980). Between 1945 and 1960, the number of schools almost doubled, that 
of teachers almost quadrupled, and that of students more than tripled. By 1960, primary 
education became virtually universal in Korea. Secondary enrollment ratio increased from 3 
percent in 1945 to 29 percent in 1960, and tertiary enrollment increased from 4 persons to 41 
persons per 10,000 population during the same period (McGinn et al. 1980). Considering that 
the government’s budgetary commitment to public education was minimal during that period, 
the speed of educational expansion would have been slower without land reform. The land 
reform and expansion of education laid the foundations for rapid industrialization and 
economic growth with equity (Rodrik 1995; Lie 1998; You 2012; You 2014b). 
Why did the USMG and the South Korean government implement such radical land 
reform? What made the reform so successful? Certainly landlords resisted. Their 
 
 
 
 
representatives tried to delay and water down the reform. However, their resistance was 
eventually not effective even though the landlord-dominated Korea Democratic Party was the 
largest party represented in the National Assembly. Both external and internal factors were 
favorable for reform. 
The communist threat from North Korea and US policy played important roles (You 
2014b; You 2015). In March1946, in the Soviet-occupied north, the Provisional People’s 
Committee implemented a land reform based on uncompensated confiscation and free 
distribution. The radical land reform in the North compelled US policymakers as well as 
South Korean political leaders to embrace some form of land reform to prevent a majority of 
the peasant population from being attracted to the communist propaganda. The U.S. Military 
Government initially took a conservative position regarding land reform. However, the USMG 
switched its position to pursuing liberal land reform in 1946 and redistributed formerly 
Japanese-held land in 1948 before the South Korean government was established. 
Moreover, the U.S. continued to advise the newly formed South Korean government to 
quickly carry out liberal land reform. As the Cold War developed, U.S. foreign policy was 
centered on preventing the spread of communism, and liberal land reform was considered an 
effective tool to fight communism.  
Domestic politics was not favorable for landlords, either. After liberation from 
Japanese rule, landlords were on the defensive because of their collaboration with the 
Japanese colonial powers. Peasant movements and leftist political parties were initially 
strong right after independence, although the U.S. Military Government quickly repressed 
them. When the elections for South Korea’s Constitutional National Assembly in May 1950, 
the leftists and some nationalists boycotted the elections in opposition to establishing two 
separate governments in the peninsula. As a result, the landlord-representing the Korea 
Democratic Party became the largest party in the Assembly. However, the KDP turned out to 
be not effective in representing landlord interests in the legislature.  
Article 86 in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (promulgated on July 17, 1948) 
stipulated land redistribution.” When the initial draft was presented to the plenary of the 
Assembly, it read, “Farmland shall in principle be distributed to farmers.” However, the 
Assembly voted to remove the words “in principle” in spite of opposition from the Korean 
Democratic Party-affiliated lawmakers (Seo 2007). This indicates that popular support for the 
“land-to-the-tiller” principle was strong at that time. 
Syngman Rhee forged a conservative coalition with the KDP and was elected 
president by the National Assembly. However, President Rhee began to distance himself 
from the KDP and surprisingly appointed Cho Bong-am, a former communist, as Minister of 
Agriculture. Although the KDP attempted to increase compensation to 300 percent, the 
assembly passed a land reform bill with 150 percent of compensation. When President Rhee 
signed it into law on 10 March 1950, he urged the administrators to quickly implement the 
redistribution of lands so that the tenants might know they would be farming their own lands 
immediately. One of his hidden motives might have been to weaken his main opposition, the 
landlord-dominated KDP, in the upcoming 30 May elections (Kim 1995). President Rhee was 
also motivated for land reform to prevent communism by removing an effective propaganda 
mechanism of the Communist North Korea: its land reform. When the implementation of land 
redistribution resumed after several months of interruption due to the Korean War, Rhee told 
Yoon Young-sun, then Minister of Agriculture, to complete the land reform as soon as 
possible “if you want to prevail over communism” (Kim 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Civil service reform (1950s-1990s) 
Previous developmental state literature credited Park Chung-hee, who ruled the country for 
18 years after the military coup of 1961, for establishing a meritocratic and autonomous 
bureaucracy, overhauling the patronage-ridden bureaucracy of the Syngman Rhee period 
(Kim 1987; Evans 1995; Cheng, Haggard and Kang 1998). However, my own research 
shows that meritocracy developed gradually over time and that the short-lived Chang Myon 
government (1960-61) made a no less important contribution than Park did (You 2014b, 
2015: 149-157). 
Previous studies focused on the proportion of special appointments vs. appointments 
through competitive civil service examination for higher entry-level positions (Grade III-B 
level). Byung-kook Kim (1987: 101) argued that the proportion of higher entry-level positions 
filled with higher civil service examinees “quintupled” from 4.1 percent to 20.6 percent 
between the Rhee period and Park period, and his study has been repeatedly cited by other 
scholars. Since internal promotions represented 65.3 percent and 68.5 percent of Grade III-B 
appointments during the Rhee and Park periods, this implies that the proportion of Haengsi 
recruits among the new recruits increased from 11.8 percent under Rhee to 65.4 percent 
under Park. However, his comparison was based on the average for the whole Rhee period 
(1948-60) and the average for the last three years of Park’s rule (1977-79). This is 
misleading because there were large differences between the first few years of new 
bureaucracy building and the later years of the Rhee period as well as between the earlier 
years and later years of Park period. 
As Table 2 shows, the proportion of meritocratic recruitment through the competitive 
civil service examination for higher entry-level positions (Grade III-B level) increased from 4.7 
percent during the first few years of new bureaucracy building (1948-1952) to 48.3 percent 
during the later years of the Rhee period (1953-1959). The proportion actually dropped 
slightly to 35.6-38.3 percent in the early period of Park Chung-hee (1964-1965), but it 
increased again to 55.0 percent (1966-73) and to 65.2 percent in the last three years of his 
presidency (1977-1979). It further increased to 70.4 percent after the democratic transition 
(1988-1995). This is contradictory to the myth that Park established a meritocratic 
bureaucracy early during his rule. The fall in the proportion of recruitment through 
competitive civil service examination for Grade III-B during the early years of Park’s regime 
reflects a sizable number of appointments given to ex-military members. While the military 
junta criticized the special recruitment practices during the Rhee and Chang administrations, 
they employed the same practices. The Park regime seems to have compromised the 
principle of meritocracy in order to secure the loyalty of the military by rewarding them with 
bureaucratic posts and to control the bureaucracy through military-turned-bureaucrats. The 
practice of appointing ex-military members to bureaucratic posts continued under another 
military dictator Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87) until it was abolished in 1988 after the democratic 
transition (Bark 1998; Ju and Kim 2006: 262). Thus, Park compromised the meritocratic 
principle with favoritism because he was simultaneously concerned about the 
professionalization of the bureaucracy and about securing the loyalty of bureaucrats (Ha and 
Kang 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Modes of new recruitment at the Grade III-B level, 1948-1995 
Period Haengsi* Special 
1948-52 4.7 95.3 
1953-59 48.3 51.7 
1964 38.3 61.7 
1965 35.6 64.4 
1966-73 55.0 45.0 
1977-79 65.2 34.8 
1980-87 64.6 35.4 
1988-95 70.4 29.6 
Note: Haengsi refers to higher civil service examination for the higher entry-level (Grade III-B) 
positions. 
Source: You (2015: 150). 
As another piece of evidence for Park’s creation of a meritocratic bureaucracy, Kim (1987: 
101-2) noted that higher ranks above Grade III-B were ﬁlled primarily on the basis of “special 
appointments” under Rhee but primarily through “internal promotion” under Park. Again his 
comparison is between the whole period of Rhee (1948-1960) and the late period of Park 
(1977-1979). This is problematic, because in the early years of building the new state, it 
would have been impossible to fill most of the higher positions through internal promotion, as 
such promotions require several years of internal experience. While the average proportions 
of internal promotions for Grade II (director general) and Grade III-A (director) during the 
whole period of Rhee (1948-60) were 47.1 percent and 60.2 percent, the same proportions in 
1960 were 78.9 percent and 79.6 percent (Bark 1961: 206; Kang 2002: 70-71). These 
proportions further increased to 93.2 percent and 91.9 percent by 1977-1979 (Kim 1987: 
101). If we interpret the increase of internal promotion and reduction of special appointments 
at higher levels of bureaucracy as improvement in meritocracy, this improvement was made 
gradually over time. A large part of the increase in internal promotion might simply reflect the 
maturity of the bureaucracy, or the existence of an increased number of bureaucrats who 
have served for at least a minimum required number of years to be eligible for internal 
promotion (Kang 2002: 69-71). 
In fact, a more important indicator for the development of a meritocratic bureaucracy 
can be found in the recruitment of the lower entry-level officials (Grade V-B). A significant 
development in this regard took place after the Student Revolution; civil service examinations 
for Grade V-B were first administered in 1960 by the short-lived democratic government led 
by Prime Minister Chang Myon (1960-1961). It was important to recruit a large number of 
lower-level civil servants at Grade V-B through open and competitive examination, 
considering that a large number of those who entered the civil service at the lowest level 
were promoted in a relatively short time during the 1950s and 1960s. Table 3 presents the 
numbers of successful applicants in civil service exams at Grades III-B, IV-B, and V-B, from 
1949-1980. The table underscores the importance of introducing the civil service examination 
for Grade V-B. Until 1959, civil service examinations were restricted to the recruitment of a 
small number of highly coveted elite bureaucrats at Grades III-B and IV-B. Starting in 1960 
after the Student Revolution, civil service examinations became widely accessible to 
thousands of youths every year, opening up the wide road to the bureaucracy. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Number of successful applicants in civil service exams, 1949-1980. 
Year 
Grade III-
B 
Grade 
IV-B 
Grade V-
B Year 
Grade III-
B 
Grade 
IV-B 
Grade V-
B 
1949 5 32 
 
1965 28 1033 6372 
1950 
   
1966 50 193 3418 
1951 38 38 
 
1967 24 214 10391 
1952 16 61 
 
1968 45 664 4673 
1953 33 44 
 
1969 55 509 3878 
1954 13 87 
 
1970 65 24 2863 
1955 58 61 
 
1971 188 58 2359 
1956 11 56 
 
1972 88 100 771 
1957 7 18 
 
1973 212 
 
2037 
1958 27 44 
 
1974 115 205 4120 
1959 36 54 
 
1975 201 154 2723 
1960 20 106 2066 1976 73 446 4651 
1961 72 107 1643 1977 186 531 3975 
1962 38 57 2413 1978 250 693 3992 
1963 39 236 5535 1979 248 551 1365 
1964 24 121 3014 1980 187 395 1473 
Source: You (2015: 156). 
The above discussion suggests that too much credit has been given to Park by 
previous developmental state literature with regard to the establishment of meritocratic 
bureaucracy in Korea. The overall picture displays the gradual development of meritocracy 
during the later years of Rhee (1953-60), democratic Chang (1960-61), Park (1961-79), and 
post-Park periods. Meritocracy further developed after the democratic transition in 1987. The 
special recruitment system for the ex-military officers was abolished in 1988, and the 
proportion of civil service exam recruits at the Grade III-B level surpassed 70 percent (See 
Table 2). In addition, a series of reforms were implemented to advance professional 
bureaucracy. Some of these reforms included the assurance of political neutrality, the 
legalization of public unions, and the introduction of parliamentary hearings for the 
appointment of ministers. (Ju and Kim 2006).  
Then, what made it possible for South Korea to develop meritocracy over time? Some 
scholars emphasized the influence of a Confucian tradition of bureaucracy in Korea 
(Cumings 1984; Evans 1995; Kim 1987; Lie 1998; Woo-Cumings 1995). In Korea, 
competitive examination for civil servant recruitment was first introduced in 958 during the 
Koryo Dynasty (918-1392). Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) further developed the civil service 
examinations. In the late Chosun period, however, the sale of offices and various types of 
cheating in civil service examinations became increasingly common (Lee 2000). Thus, there 
were fluctuations in the use of competitive civil service examinations in Korean history. The 
Confucian-bureaucratic tradition cannot sufficiently explain the development of meritocracy in 
Korea, although it might have been one of the enabling factors.  
Some scholars have also mentioned the positive effect of Japanese colonial 
bureaucracy. It is notable that the positive influence of the Japanese legacy, if any, was 
limited in Korea, because few Koreans had occupied high-level positions in the colonial 
bureaucracy. In addition, former Japanese colonial bureaucrats had a negative influence on 
the development of meritocracy because they did not want rapid expansion of meritocratic 
 
 
 
 
recruitment through civil service examinations, as this could reduce their opportunities for 
promotion and even threaten their positions (Bark 1966; Lee 1968).1  
My own research suggests that rapid expansion of education increased pressures for 
meritocratic recruitment. During the 1950s and 1960s, the pressures for meritocracy came 
mainly from university students and professors. They often complained about the small 
number of recruits through competitive civil service examinations (You 2015: 156-7, 166-7). 
As the number of college graduates increased, it became increasingly difficult for them to find 
jobs because the private sector jobs were neither plenty and nor very attractive and the 
number of public sector jobs open to competitive examinations was to small to absorb them. 
The April Student Revolution of 1960 further increased pressure for expansion of civil service 
examinations. Thus, the Chang Myon government (1960-1961) first administered civil service 
examination for Grade V-B (lowest level) to absorb the students (Lee 1996: 111-12). The 
military junta who seized the power by overthrowing the legitimate government could not 
ignore the students’ demand for meritocracy. So the Park regime not only continued the civil 
service examinations for Grade V-B but implemented reforms to professionalize civil service 
that had been planned by the Chang Myon government.  
It is also notable that land reform indirectly contributed to the development of a 
meritocratic bureaucracy by helping to rapidly expand education, particularly college 
education, and correspondingly increase the pressures for democracy and fairness. In 
particular, opportunities for higher education were no longer restricted to upper classes 
unlike in the colonial period. Hence, the expansion of higher education helped to 
institutionalize meritocracy as a norm. In addition, land reform dissolved the landed elite and 
thereby helped to avoid bureaucratic penetration from the powerful elite, which was often 
found in societies dominated by the landed elite (Ziblatt 2009). Land reform also opened 
space for state autonomy by insulating the bureaucracy from powerful societal interests 
(Amsden 1989; Cumings 1984; Evans 1995; Lie 1998; Rodrik 1995).  
The gradual improvement in meritocracy in bureaucratic recruitment and promotion 
helped to spread the norms of impartiality and universalism in the bureaucracy. Thus, 
bureaucratic corruption declined over time in Korea with the development of a meritocratic 
bureaucracy. The ratio of public officials indicted for corruption to public officials indicted for 
any crime has steadily declined from 36.8% in the 1950s, under President Rhee, to 17.2% in 
the 1960s and 16.1% in the 1970s under President Park, to 14.3% in the early 1980s under 
President Chun, and to 3.6% in the 2000s, under President Roh Moo-hyun (See Appendix 
Table A4). In the 1950s, if a public official were indicted, the probability that the cause for 
indictment was a charge of corruption would have been more than one in three. If a public 
official were indicted in the early 1980s, the probability of his or her having been accused of 
corruption would have been around one in seven. In the 2000s, that probability would be only 
one in thirty. It is notable that the development of meritocracy and the reduction in the 
relative frequency of bureaucrats prosecuted for corruption are highly correlated. The 
improvement in bureaucratic corruption has occurred gradually over time, in tandem with the 
gradual improvement in meritocracy.  
Democratization (1960, 1987) 
South Korea’s constitution introduced democratic institutions, and it was an electoral 
democracy from 1948-1961 and 1963-1972. However, South Korea was not really a liberal 
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 Author’s interview with an old retired bureaucrat corroborates this argument. 
 
 
 
 
democracy until the democratic transition of 1987, except for the one-year period after the 
April 19 Student Revolution of 1960. Basic rights as well as universal suffrage were granted 
by the 1948 constitution, but Koreans were not yet prepared to exert their political rights and 
civil liberties.  
Syngman Rhee was elected as the first president of Republic of Korea by the 
National Assembly in 1948. President Rhee became increasingly authoritarian over his 
twelve-year presidency (1948–60). The Rhee regime did not hesitate to suppress opposition 
and manipulate elections to perpetuate his rule. The National Security Law, enacted in 1948, 
made both communism and recognition of North Korea as a political entity illegal and was 
used to suppress and persecute dissidents and left-leaning political leaders and groups. 
When Rhee faced opposition from a majority of members of the parliament and his chance of 
being reelected as president by the parliament became thin, he amended the constitution to 
introduce direct presidential election in 1952. He successfully mobilized state terror and 
threats by imposing martial law to force the members of the parliament to agree to the 
constitutional amendment. President Rhee engineered another constitutional amendment in 
an irregular way to remove the presidential term limit for the first president of the Republic.2  
Rhee’s Liberal Party was essentially nothing more than his personal networks (Lee 
1968: 71–6; Lie 1998: 35). The Liberal Party did not have any class base, while the leading 
opposition, the Democratic Party, had as its initial base the landed class. Since the landed 
class was dissolved after the land reform, the political competition grew oriented toward 
personal appeals of leaders and distribution of patronage. Vote buying practices became 
widespread and fraudulent vote counting was common. Thus, the formally open access 
political system did not in fact guarantee open access and competition in political affairs. 
The people’s demand for democracy increased over time from 1960 to 1987. 
Expansion of education produced anti-authoritarian forces among students and intellectuals. 
Industrialization and economic growth expanded the middle class and working class, and 
their voices and organizations grew. Student demonstrations in protest of massive election 
fraud during the 1960 presidential election escalated into the April 19th Student Revolution of 
1960, leading to the resignation of Syngman Rhee as president. The democratic period did 
not last long, however, as the military junta led by General Park Chung-hee overthrew the 
Chang Myeon government (1960–1) in May 1961. Although prodemocracy forces were 
growing, they were too weak then to contend with the military. 
Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan ruled Korea formally as civilian presidents for 
most of the time, but they filled the bulk of the ruling party leadership and the bureaucracy 
with those from the military. Since the military junta promised to transfer power to a civilian 
government, largely due to U.S. pressures, they had to prepare Park’s running for 
presidential election. Kim Jong-pil, Park’s nephew and a core member of the military coup, 
established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which became notorious for its 
persecution of dissidents and violations of human rights. He then created the Democratic 
Republican Party, using the organizational base of the KCIA. The core leadership and the 
staff of the KCIA as well as the DRP came from the military. The DRP’s major platforms 
included economic development and anticommunism. It did not have any class base, and the 
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 The amendment motion failed to pass the National Assembly, one vote short of the two-thirds 
supermajority required for constitutional amendment. The next day, however, the Speaker of the 
Assembly declared that the motion had passed by rounding off the decimal point for the calculation of 
two thirds.  
 
 
 
 
military officers that constituted the leadership of the DRP were from humble social 
backgrounds. Over time, however, the DRP forged an alliance with the chaebols. Park had to 
dispense patronage to military officers not only to utilize their loyalty for governing but also to 
prevent any revolt from within the military.  
Park won the 1963 presidential election, but only with a razor-thin margin in spite of 
huge operations by the DRP and the bureaucratic apparatus. The 1971 presidential election, 
in which Kim Dae-jung ran against him as the main opposition candidate, was also close. 
There were speculations that Park might have lost the 1963 and 1971 elections without 
large-scale vote buying and vote counting fraud. As Park found no constitutional path beyond 
his third term, he declared martial law, disbanded the National Assembly, and junked the 
existing constitution in the name of Yushin (reformation) in October 1972. The Yushin 
Constitution abolished direct presidential election, effectively guaranteeing him a life-long 
presidency. It also gave him the authority to appoint a third of the National Assembly 
members, guaranteeing an absolute majority to the ruling DRP. Park issued many 
emergency measures to suppress criticism of the Yushin Constitution and his dictatorship. 
Anticommunist rhetoric was conveniently used to suppress dissidents. The National Security 
Law was frequently abused to persecute dissidents, and the Korean CIA and police were 
used to suppress antigovernment activities.  
The anti-dictatorship student movement continued to grow in spite of harsh 
suppression, and the popular support for the authoritarian Park regime declined. The major 
opposition New Democratic Party won the most votes in the 1978 general National Assembly 
elections, although Park’s DRP still maintained a large majority in the National Assembly 
because of its advantage from the electoral system. After Park’s assassination by KCIA chief 
Kim Jae-kyu in 1979, there was another short period of democratic opening, called the 
“spring of Seoul.” However, the military junta led by General Chun Doo-hwan seized power 
through a two-stage coup and bloody suppression of the Kwangju democratization 
movement in 1980. After a short period of direct military rule, Chun became a civilian 
president through an uncontested indirect election. It was not easy, however, to contain the 
ever-growing student and labor movements, particularly as student and labor groups became 
increasingly radical and militant. While student movements used largely peaceful tactics 
before the Kwangju democratization movement, they more frequently utilized violent tactics 
such as the use of Molotov cocktails in the 1980s. 
When hundreds of thousands of citizens, including students, blue-collar workers, and 
new middle-class white-collar workers, came out to the streets of Seoul and all over the 
country in 1987, President Chun had to surrender to their key demands for democracy, 
including direct presidential election. President Chun considered using military force to 
suppress the demonstrations, but apparently he could not risk committing another massacre 
like the one that occurred during the violent suppression of the Kwangju in 1980. The United 
States urged Chun to refrain from using military force, perhaps alarmed by the increasing 
anti-American sentiments among Koreans due to U.S. support of the military crackdown of 
the Kwangju. 
What made democratization movements eventually successful in 1987, while earlier 
efforts failed? The university students constituted the core of the organized forces for 
democratization movement, confronting the military-chaebol coalition. Starting with the 
Student Revolution of 1960, college students played a central role in democratization 
movement throughout the authoritarian period. Growing urban middle class with high 
 
 
 
 
education also played an important role, particularly in the large demonstrations demanding 
direct presidential election in 1987 and also in the post-1987 civil society organizations.  
It is also notable that the decreased perceptions of North Korean security threat 
provided more favorable conditions for democratization than in the earlier period. North 
Korean threat had been not only a convenient rationale for the Park Chung-hee and Chun 
Doo-hwan regimes to justify their authoritarian rule but also a primary reason why the United 
States had backed up military coups and authoritarian regimes in South Korea.  
While both the earlier democratic episode (1960-1961) and the spring of Seoul after 
the assassination of Park Ching-hee in October 1979 were short-lived and interrupted by 
military interventions, they still had some constraining effects on the authoritarian regimes of 
Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Both Park and Chun had to demonstrate their efforts 
to punish corruption as well as their commitment to economic development in order to fill 
their “legitimacy deficit.” They also had to try to respect and accommodate the demands of 
university students and professors, such as the expansion of civil service examinations and 
the development of a professional civil service, as far as they are not threatening their 
regime. However, the authoritarian regimes’ reliance on clientelistic strategies has inevitably 
increased not only petty electoral corruption but high-level political corruption and collusion 
between the government and chaebol (Schopf 2004). 
Democratic consolidation and deepening: Good governance reforms (1988- ) 
While the first democratic transition in 1960 was quickly followed by Park Chung-hee’s coup 
in 1961 and the second democratic opening in 1979 was suppressed by Chun Doo-hwan’s 
military junta in 1980, the democratic transition of 1987 was more resilient and proceeded 
toward democratic consolidation and deepening. Democratic consolidation required first and 
foremost the firm civilian control of the military. Ensuring the rule of law and empowerment of 
the civil society were also important for consolidation and deepening of democracy. Civil 
society organizations pushed for governance reforms to embrace ethical universalism, and 
governments implemented various reforms for transparency and anti-corruption. 
During the democratic transition in 1987 the military exercised self-restraint. The 
experience of Kwangju massacre, which had not only made the popular image of the military 
extremely negative but encouraged radicalization of student and social movements, must 
have been an important constraint. President Kim Young-sam (1993–8), the first civilian 
president after Syngman Rhee, purged a group of politically ambitious military officers. 
Former presidents Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo were prosecuted and convicted of 
treason and corruption in 1996, which sent a strong message to the military that even 
successful coup leaders could be punished eventually. When the Koreans elected Kim Dae-
jung, a long-time opposition leader formerly accused by the authoritarian regimes of being 
pro-communist or pro-North Korea, as president in 1997, the military did not intervene. This 
proved the firm establishment of civilian control of the military. There has not been a single 
attempted coup since the democratic transition. 
Democracy also provided checks on arbitrary state violence such as torture, 
unexplained death, and violent suppression of protests. In parallel, militant social movements 
declined and lost influence. The rule of law improved as well. In particular, the Constitutional 
Court played an important role in protecting human rights and property rights.  
Democratization facilitated further development of civil society. Existing organizations 
that had been tightly controlled by the government gained autonomy. Under authoritarian 
 
 
 
 
regimes, not only political organizations and trade unions but also business and professional 
associations had been tightly controlled by the government. Many social movement 
organizations and unions that had not been legally recognized obtained freedom to organize. 
Numerous organizations were newly created in various fields. Many of the NGOs, unions, 
and professional associations currently active were formed during the first three years of 
democracy (Mo and Weingast 2013). It is evident that empowerment of civil society that 
advocates for universalism has been an important factor for contemporary control of 
corruption in South Korea.  
During the authoritarian period, the policy process was opaque and closed and the 
strong executive dominated both policy-making and policy-implementing processes with 
virtually no constraints from the legislature and judiciary. With democratization, policy 
process became increasingly transparent and open. The power of the legislature and the 
independence of the judiciary were gradually strengthened both under the first two 
conservative administrations (1988-1997) and the two liberal/progressive administrations 
(1998-2007).  
During the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1997), a number of new legislations 
such as Freedom of Information Act and Administrative Procedures Act contributed to 
enhancing transparency and openness of the government. In particular, enactment of the 
Real Name Financial Transaction Act enhanced transparency of financial flows by prohibiting 
fake-name and borrowed-name accounts. President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) implemented 
far-reaching reforms to increase transparency in both public and corporate sectors. He and 
President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2007) implemented a series of reforms to enhance 
transparency and openness of the government, particularly in terms of e-governance and 
budget transparency (You and Lee 2013). The country’s e-governance systems, including 
the online procurement system and online public engagement system, are internationally 
recognized as a model case of good governance (Kalinowski and Kim 2014). Consolidated 
central government fiscal data, all budget and audit reports approved by the National 
Assembly and data for each local government are available online. Participatory budgeting 
was first introduced by some leftist local governments in 2002 and has been diffused 
throughout the local governments. During the conservative Lee Myung-bak government 
(2008-2012) there was some regression, such as circumvention of feasibility studies for the 
controversial Four River Projects (Lee and You 2014). However, South Korea is regarded as 
one of the top performers in budget transparency in the Asia-Pacific region, according to 
Open Budget Index (IBP 2012). In the 2012 OBI, the country ranked eighth out of one 
hundred countries surveyed and second in the Asia-Pacific region behind only New Zealand.  
President Kim Young-sam (1993-97) also launched an aggressive anti-corruption 
campaign in response to public criticism of electoral and political corruption. He declared that 
he would not receive any money from businesses during his presidency and introduced 
reforms in party and campaign finance. He introduced mandatory disclosure of personal 
assets of senior public officials. He also oversaw prosecution of a number of powerful 
politicians in charges of corruption, which culminated in the prosecution of two former 
presidents.  
The Anti-Corruption Act was enacted in 2001 during Kim Dae-jung administration 
(1998-2002). The law includes a code of conduct for civil servants. The law provides 
protection and rewards for whistle-blowers, ensuring the right for government employees to 
report fraud, corruption, government waste, and various illegal activities within the 
 
 
 
 
government. The Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers became effective in 
2011, which protects whistleblowers in the private sector as well. The Korea Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (renamed Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission after 
a merger with the Administrative Appeals Commission and the Ombudsman of Korea in 
2008) was created in 2002 according to the law. The independent anti-corruption agency 
evaluates annually anticorruption activities of government agencies and makes 
recommendations. 
Surprisingly, President Roh Moo-hyun encouraged the prosecution to conduct 
thorough investigation of illegal campaign funds for both his camp and his opponent’s camp 
for the first time in Korean history. The results were shocking. It was found that several 
chaebol delivered truckloads of cash to the conservative opposition candidate, Lee Hoi-
chang. Lee’s illegal fundraising totaled 82.3 billion Won, while Roh’s amounted to 12 billion 
Won. The prosecution of illegal presidential campaign funds had a large impact on the 
behavior of political parties, politicians, and chaebol. The conservative Grand National Party 
had to strive hard to change its image as the “corrupt party.” In addition, there was further 
reform of political and campaign finance that required more transparent fundraising and 
expenditures. Thanks to a series of reforms under Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh 
Moo-hyun, chaebol’s routine practices of annually delivering billions of Won to the president 
seem to have disappeared. Although corporate and political corruption scandals still occur, 
they are of smaller scales than before. 
After the Sewol Ferry accident of March 2014, which revealed the problem of 
entrenched regulatory capture and corruption, the need for additional anti-corruption laws 
has been debated. The Act for Banning Illegitimate Solicitations and Gifts was passed in 
March 2015 to strengthen ethical requirements for public officials by criminalizing receipt of 
monetary or material benefits of over a million Won (about $1,000) even if it is not a quid pro 
quo for specific favor. A conflict-of-interest bill is pending in the National Assembly. 
Behind a number of transparency and anti-corruption legislations and programs were 
civil society actions (You 2003). After the democratic transition of 1987, civil society demands 
for anti-corruption and transparency grew. NGOs such as Citizens’ Coalition for Economic 
Justice and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy have been fighting for broad 
political, economic and social reforms to promote norms of ethical universalism. Good 
governance organizations such as Transparency International-Korea have been focusing 
their work on monitoring political and corporate corruption and advocating for transparency 
and openness of the government. These organizations’ enduring legislative campaigns for 
the real-name financial transaction system, freedom of information and Anti-Corruption Act 
were largely responsible for the enactment of these laws. Prosecution of two former corrupt 
presidents would not have happened without organized civil society actions, because 
President Kim Young-sam was initially reluctant to prosecute them.  
Civil society groups also played an important role in reducing vote-buying and 
clientelism and promoting programmatic politics. They established a large coalition of 
national- and local-level fair election campaigns, monitoring and reporting vote-buying and 
other irregularities, starting in the 1991 local elections. They created a coalition of anti-money 
politics in 1996, pressuring the politicians to regulate campaign finance transparently. In 
2000 CCEJ released a list of unfit candidates for the upcoming National Assembly elections 
and subsequently a large scale civil society coalition to demand political parties not to 
nominate the unfit candidates and to defeat them in the main elections was established. The 
 
 
 
 
negative campaign for unfit candidates, most of whom had been convicted or accused of 
corruption, had a significant effect. Political parties did not nominate many on the list. Out of 
86 blacklisted candidates who got party nomination or ran as independents, 59 or 69 percent 
lost their elections. In 2004 National Assembly elections, 129 candidates or 63 percent out of 
206 candidates blacklisted by the civil society coalition lost (Kim 2006). The negative 
campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of the concerted civil society actions. Political 
parties had to repeatedly take measures to remove corrupt elements, including the reform of 
nomination criteria and procedures.  
Civil society organizations also played a role in promoting programmatic competition. 
CCEJ first published a book on 54 reform agenda in 1992, and pressed the presidential 
candidates to state their positions on the agenda. Real name financial transaction system 
and Freedom of Information Act were part of the agenda. Many organizations followed suit in 
subsequent national elections. Although the conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak 
and Park Geun-hye have been less accommodating civil society demands and increasing 
suppression of critics and anti-government demonstrations (You 2014a; Haggard and You 
2015), the vibrant civil society in the country has been and will likely be an important 
constraint on the abuse of executive power. 
Democratic deepening: Reform of crony capitalism (1998- ) 
Although sweeping land reform in South Korea dissolved the landlord class and created quite 
egalitarian socio-economic structures, Park Chung-hee’s choice of chaebol-favoring 
industrial policy increased economic concentration and income inequality over time. When 
Park Chung-hee launched export-oriented industrialization policy in the 1960s, he initially 
tried to support the firms according to objective criteria such as amount of exports. However, 
his idea of emulating Japanese pre-war conglomerates, or zaibatsu,3 coupled with the launch 
of heavy and chemical industrialization drive led the government to concentrate government 
favors such as provision of low interest loans and government guarantee of foreign loans on 
the large chaebol that were able to invest in heavy and chemical industries. Initially the 
government was in control of the chaebol. Over time, not only cozy relations developed 
between the government and the chaebol, but the government often found itself it had no 
option to bail out the troubled chaebol at the expense of other economic actors and 
taxpayers even when the troubles were caused by reckless investments and 
mismanagement. Also, the authoritarian rulers came to increasingly rely on the chaebol’s 
illicit political contribution to meet the clientelistic resources, further enabling the latter to 
capture the former. Thus, increasing economic concentration by chaebol and business-
government collusion became great concerns of the public (Kang 2002).  
As the size and power of the chaebols grew, the Chun Doo-hwan government (1980–
7) began to take measures to promote gradual economic liberalization. The government 
liberalized imports gradually at the request of the U.S., but it also began to liberalize financial 
markets by reducing regulations of nonbank financial institutions, many of which had been 
controlled by chaebol groups. In addition, measures such as the enactment of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act were introduced to counter the market power of the chaebols, 
but these measures were not vigorously implemented. Interesting, chaebols grew even 
bigger and concentration increased further as a result of liberalization measures. Combined 
                                                          
3
 Both the Korean word chaebol and the Japanese word zaibatsu share the same Chinese characters, 
財閥. 
 
 
 
 
sales of the top ten chaebols, as a percent of GDP, grew from 15.1 percent in 1974 to 32.8 
percent in 1979 to 67.4 percent in 1984 (Amsden 1989: 116, 134–7). 
Democratization provided both opportunities and constraints for reform of chaebol-
dominated economy (Kalinowski 2009). On one hand, popular demand for reform of 
chaebol’s abuse of market power and non-market power rose. On the other hand, major 
political parties and politicians had to rely on chaebol’s illicit contributions to meet their need 
for clientelistic resources. Hence, their political influence grew and the policy-making process 
was increasingly captured by the chaebol. Political and social organizations that could 
counterbalance chaebol influence were not strong enough. This imbalance of power led to an 
economic policy more responsive to chaebols’ demands than to popular demand for chaebol 
reform. The government was unable to contain the chaebols’ moral hazard, and their 
incentives to become too big to fail (TBTF) led to overinvestment and overborrowing, 
including excessive short-term foreign debt. The Kim Young-sam government’s (1993–8) 
reform efforts were stalled. Instead, capital market account liberalization and deregulation of 
nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) encouraged the chaebols to finance their overly 
ambitious investment through their affiliated NBFIs and international capital markets. 
Although the Korean economy was growing continuously after democratization, it became 
vulnerable to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 after a series of bankruptcies of 
overleveraged chaebols. 
The breakthrough came with the financial crisis. The IMF conditionality attached to 
the bailout loan was a strong external pressure. Newly elected reform-minded president Kim 
Dae-jung launched the so-called IMF-plus, a comprehensive reform program that went 
beyond the IMF-mandated reforms. President Kim pursued the “parallel development of 
democracy and market economy” and declared the end of government–business collusion or 
crony capitalism (You 2010). Structural reforms were carried out in the financial, corporate, 
labor, and public sectors along with liberalization of financial markets. The chaebol reforms 
sought to enhance transparency and accountability in corporate governance and accounting 
practices. Financial reform strengthened the financial safety net and consolidated financial 
supervisory functions. Also, the government quickly expanded the social safety net such as 
unemployment insurance, health insurance, a national pension system, and public 
assistance for the poor. 
The sweeping economic reforms of the Kim Dae-jung government increased 
openness and competition in the economy (Mo-Weingast 2013). With 16 out of 30 largest 
chaebol groups disappearing in the restructuring process, the market discipline was 
immensely strengthened. There was substantial improvement in transparency and 
accountability of corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders. Financial 
markets have been completely restructured, reducing the scope of rent from bank loans. 
Many new economic players such as banks, foreign investors, and institutional investors 
came to act independent from the government and the chaebols, weakening the dominance 
of the chaebol. The economic reform weakened the collusive links of government-chaebol-
banks and increased transparency of chaebol management.  
Chaebol concentration, which peaked in 1998, declined in the subsequent years. 
However, the reform was not as thorough as was originally intended because of various 
resistance tactics and lobbying of the chaebol and the effect of reform did not last long. The 
chaebol concentration rose again. The ratio of chaebol asset to GDP fell from 90 percent in 
1998 to about 50 percent in 2002, but it reached the pre-crisis level by 2010 (Kim 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Income inequality increased as well. In particular, the top 1 percent’s income share increased 
rapidly, surpassing 12 percent in 2011 and continuously rising (Kim and Kim 2014). Also, 
corporate governance deteriorated again during the business-friendly Lee Myung-bak 
administration (2008-2012). According to the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(2015), South Korea’s corporate governance score declined from 55-58 in 2003-2004 to 45-
49 in 2010-2012. In 2012, Korea ranked not only behind Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong, but behind Thailand, Malaysia and India (See Appendix Table A5). The poor 
corporate governance in the country indicates that crony capitalism is still alive and well. The 
recurring corporate and political corruption scandals cast doubt about whether they are 
isolated cases.  
Why, then, was Kim Dae-jung able to implement substantial reform of corporate and 
financial sectors and why has the reform been regressing recently? Kim Dae-jung was less 
constrained by chaebol influence than his predecessors had been; he was also faced with 
the grave financial crisis that the public blamed on the chaebol and on high-level corruption. 
In response to this, Kim Dae-jung implemented sweeping reform of chaebol and financial 
institutions; this was the kind of reform which Kim Young-sam was unable to implement. In 
addition, the timing was right. Because of the grave financial crisis and the humiliating IMF 
bailout loan, the chaebol was on the defensive. People blamed the chaebol’s excesses and 
failures for causing the crisis. Civil society organizations that had been pushing for reform of 
chaebol corporate governance gained upper ground. In particular, PSPD organized minority 
shareholder movement to hold the chaebol chairmen and CEOs accountable for minority 
shareholders (Jang 2001). Thus, Kim government’s tacit coalition with the civil society proved 
powerful enough to overcome chaebol resistance for the first couple of years during his 
administration. 
However, the chaebol soon regained their political influence and the reform coalition 
lost power as the worst crisis was over. One important reason for the weakening of the 
reform coalition was the alienation and weakening of the organized labor. Kim 
administration’s IMF-plus reform package included measures for labor market flexibility, 
which eventually led to a breakdown of the Tripartite Commission that President Kim had 
formed to push for the comprehensive reform program. On the other hand, the top chaebol 
groups such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG that survived the crisis became even more 
dominant players in the market and their political influence was strengthened. It is commonly 
believed that Hyundai and Samsung each had close ties with the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun administrations. Moreover, when Lee Myung-bak, former CEO of a Hyundai 
company, became the president of the country in 2008, Lee administration almost became a 
chaebol republic. Not surprising, Lee administration retreated from some of the important 
reforms of the previous governments, loosening the regulations on chaebol corporate 
governance and chaebol domination of the financial sector and providing tax cuts to the 
chaebol and the wealthy. 
During the 2012 legislative elections and presidential election all the major parties 
and major presidential candidates pledged to introduce significant reform of chaebol in the 
name of “economic democracy.” Into the third year in her presidency, however, President 
Park Geun-hye and her ruling Saenuri Party have failed to make any significant progress in 
this regard. It is yet to be seen if South Korea will be able to implement significant reform for 
economic democracy in the near future or fall into a captured democracy, using Acemoglu 
and Robinson’ (2008) term. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
During the second half of the twentieth century, South Korea transformed itself from a poor 
and corrupt country into a rich and democratic country with relatively good governance. 
South Korea is regarded as one of the three East Asian countries that have completed 
(Japan) or moved far along the transition to an “open access order” (South Korea and 
Taiwan), in which governance of the polity and economy is based on equality and 
impartiality, or norms of ethical universalism (North et al. 2009). The process-tracing of the 
transition, albeit incomplete and even fragile, indicates that the transformation of governance 
norms was not just a byproduct of economic development but took place in a broader context 
of changes in the political economy of the country.  
In particular, I have identified five critical reforms: (1) the radical land reform that took 
place in two stages in 1948 and 1950, which dissolved the landed elite and produced 
favorable conditions for state autonomy as well as rapid expansion of education; (2) the 
gradual process of civil service reform during the Syngman Rhee government (1948-60), 
short-lived democratic Chang Myeon government (1960-61), Park Chung-hee regime (1961-
79), and post-democratic transition period (1988- ), which improved meritocracy in 
bureaucracy and thereby reduced bureaucratic corruption; (3) democratization (1960, 1987), 
which required long struggles of the civil society led by student movement and supported by 
the growing middle class and working class; (4) good governance reforms to enhance 
transparency and to control corruption, particularly under presidents Kim Young-sam (1993-
97), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-07); (5) reform of the corporate 
and financial sectors by Kim Dae-jung administration in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
1997, which aimed at ending crony capitalism and enhancing transparency of chaebol 
governance and market competition.  
None of these reforms just happened naturally or was simply given by a benevolent 
dictator. Each reform was achieved at least partly by the struggle of the civil society and in 
turn helped to empower the civil society. The historical experiences of South Korea show the 
importance of both structural conditions and human agency. However, even favorable 
structural conditions such as the dissolution of the landed elite and egalitarian socio-
economic structure were not given naturally. There was a critical role of human agency, or 
the capacity of politicians and civil society actors to overcome the collective action problem. 
However, South Korea’s recent records in corruption and corporate governance as 
well as some backsliding in freedom of speech and civil liberties raise concerns about the 
possibility of reverting back to a “limited access order”, or governance based on 
particularism. South Korea’s vibrant civil society provides an optimistic ground for the 
prospect of eventual completion of transition to an open access order with ethical 
universalism, but there is some uncertainty about whether the country will move forward. 
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Appendix: Various Indicators of Corruption Control in South Korea  
Figure A1. The trends of CPI and Control of Corruption in Korea, 1995-2014 
 
Note: CPI score used to range between 0 (most corrupt) and 10 (least corrupt), and the scale has 
changed to between 0 and 100 in 2014. I have normalized the CPI scores so that it may range 
between 0 and 1. Control of Corruption score has a standardized normal distribution, with the mean of 
0 and standard deviation of 1.  
Sources: Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/), Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). 
 
Table A1. Percentage of people whose family members have bribed during the last 12 
months 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008/09 2010 2013 Average 
Japan 1 0 3 1 1 8.9 1 2.3 
South 
Korea 6 4 2 1 2 2.4 3 2.9 
Hong Kong 1 0 6 3 7 5.2 
 
3.7 
Singapore 1 4 1 
 
5 8.8 
 
4.0 
Malaysia 3 6 3 6 8 9.1 3 5.4 
China 
     
9.3 
 
9.3 
Taiwan 1 3 2 
  
7.1 36 9.8 
Philippines 21 9 16 32 11 16.1 12 16.7 
India 16 12 12 25 8 54.2 54 25.9 
Mongolia 
    
28 47.6 45 40.2 
Cambodia   36   72 47 84.0 57 59.2 
Source: TI, Global Corruption Barometer Survey (various years), http://www.transparency.org/ 
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Table A2. The trends of bureaucratic corruption and vote-buying in South Korea 
  
19
92 
19
96 
19
97 
19
98 
19
99 
20
00 
20
01 
20
02 
20
03 
20
04 
20
05 
20
06 
20
07 
20
08 
Perceived 
corruption 
58 
     
39 
     
24 
 Disciplined for 
bribery 
16.
1 
12.
7 
17.
5 
16.
0 
15.
7 
14.
6 
10.
6 
11.
6 
8.2 
11.
0 
8.0 5.3 5.3 3.8 
Bribery 
(citizens) 
    
7.9 6.7 7.1 5.7 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 
Bribery 
(business) 
          
25.
0 
16.
2 
    
13.
8 
11.
6 
6.6 7.4 4.8 
Vote-buying 
(NA) 
18.
2 
14.
7 
   
12.
4 
   
2.9 
   
1.4 
Vote-
buying(Presid
ential) 
11.
7 
  2.9         7.0         2.1   
 * Notes: 1) “Perceived corruption” denotes the percentage of people who think most public officials 
are corrupt, according to surveys conducted by the Korea Institute for Public Administration (Jang 
2008).  
2) “Disciplined for bribery” denotes the percentage of civil servants who were given disciplinary actions 
because of bribery out of the total civil servants disciplined for any reasons (MPAS, various years).  
3) “Bribery (citizens)” denotes the percentage of the citizens who have bribed out of those who have 
contacted public official(s) at the Seoul Metropolitan Government during the last year, according to 
surveys commissioned by the SMG (various years).  
4) “Bribery (business)” denotes the percentage of the business people who have bribed public 
official(s) during the last year, according to surveys conducted by the Korea Institute for Public 
Administration (Jang 2008).  
5) Vote-buying (NA) and Vote-buying (Presidential) denote the percentage of people who have 
experienced some type of vote-buying during the National Assembly and Presidential elections, 
according to post-election surveys (National Election Management Commission, various years) 
 
 
Table A3. Percentage of businessmen who cite corruption as the biggest problem for 
doing business 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 1 0 1 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Singapore 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Taiwan 3 3 2 3.6 3.2 3.2 0.9 2.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.4 
Hong Kong 4 4 5 1.6 2.3 1.6 2.5 3.4 0.7 0.5 2.0 1.8 
Korea 6 5 8 4.6 4.0 4.7 5.9 5.9 5.6 4.5 7.1 4.3 
India 16 16 14 10.5 11.9 10.1 11.0 17.3 16.7 15.8 17.3 8.0 
China 11 15 13 12.0 11.6 7.4 7.4 9.5 8.5 9.2 10.1 12.4 
Indonesia 17 19 11 4.6 4.2 10.7 8.7 16.0 15.4 14.2 19.3 15.7 
Malaysia 4 12 8 8.0 9.0 14.5 10.4 8.0 9.6 12.7 14.4 17.0 
Philippines 22 22 23 21.5 22.3 23.9 24.3 22.7 24.4 19.3 17.8 17.6 
Thailand 17 15 13 14.7 10.8 10.3 11.0 11.4 14.5 16.7 20.2 21.4 
Source: You (2015: 52). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. The trend of bureaucratic corruption in South Korea 
  Bribery Embezzle Sum Ratio A* Ratio B** 
Rhee (48-60)*** 60 152 211 36.8% 0.20% 
Park (61-72)**** 73 157 230 17.2% 0.12% 
Park (73-79) 120 72 192 16.1% 0.06% 
Chun (80-87) 116 43 159 14.3% 0.04% 
Roh TW(88-92) 82 25 107 5.4% 0.02% 
Kim YS(93-97) 319 111 430 5.1% 0.04% 
Kim DJ(98-02) 350 86 436 5.4% 0.04% 
Roh MH(03-07) 141 60 200 3.6% 0.02% 
      
Notes: "Bribery" and "Embezzle" denotes average annual number of public officials indicted for 
bribery and embezzlement, respectively. 
"Sum" denotes sum of "Bribery" and "Embezzle."  
 *Ratio A: Ratio of # public officials indicted for corruption to # public officials indicted for any 
crime 
**Ratio B: Ratio of # public officials indicted for corruption to # of people (officials plus civilians) 
indicted for any crime 
*** Data available for 1954 and 1957 only 
  **** Data available for 1964 and 1966-72 only 
  
Table A5. Corporate Governance in Asian countries, 2003-2012 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2007 2010 2012 
Singapore 77 75 70 65 67 69 
Hong Kong 73 67 69 67 65 66 
Thailand 46 53 50 47 55 58 
Japan 
   
52 57 55 
Malaysia 55 60 56 49 52 55 
Taiwan 58 55 52 54 55 53 
India 66 62 61 56 48 51 
Korea 55 58 50 49 45 49 
China 43 48 44 45 49 45 
Philippines 37 50 46 41 37 41 
Indonesia 32 40 37 37 40 37 
(Korea's rank out of 
10) 5 5 6 5 8 7 
(Korea's rank out of 11, including Japan)   6 9 8 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association 
    
